There are a couple things I appreciate about analytic philosophy: conceptual clarity and the logical progression of ideas. These are exactly the qualities that I feel are missing from this article.
For example, the author denigrates analytic philosophy several times, calling it "rationalistic." What is this supposed to mean? It's unclear. The author doesn't make any attempt at explicating his understanding of the concept.
And what reasons does the author give for sharing his view of analytic philosophy as "rationalistic"? This too is unclear. There is an abundance of assertions, name-calling, and passive aggressive metaphors. But the article comes up short on providing any evidence.
When you get past the flowery rhetoric, it seems the author's central criticism is this: "We learned how to structure arguments without nurturing the ways of life in which they might make sense."
Indeed, courses in philosophy typically won't instruct students on how to live their lives. And that's exactly as it should be!
Courses in chemistry, finance, math, nursing, and basically every other field don't tell their students how to live their lives. Rather, they impart a body of knowledge and a way of thinking that helps students excel in their professions. There is nothing wrong with this, and philosophy does likewise. Among other things, it teaches students how to structure arguments in a logical way. Complaining about this is like complaining that chemistry courses teach students about the periodic table of elements.
If you would instead like someone to give you personalized, non-rational, "definitive" conclusions to your life questions, consider self-help gurus or religious fanatics.
As one of your other commenters said below, it is not the job of academia to tell students how they ought to live their lives. That is well and good, and I happen to agree. Indeed, a big part of philosophy’s value is that it gives students the tools to see through that kind of BS.
But I have more sympathy than that other commenter: after all, you are not writing here as an academic, and you don’t owe us the kind of analyses that they are demanding.
Instead, what seems to be missing from your piece is any discussion of the internal dynamics within the institutions that have brought this unfortunate situation about.
Philosophers and the departments they run at universities have sleep-walked into a situation where the strange, poujadiste mindset of business managers and petty administrators dictates their fortunes. Philosophy is not science, it ought not to be evaluated on the same metrics, of “impact” or whatever. And now, philosophy, with its frequent pretensions to “scientificity” on both sides of the continental/analytic divide, does not so much hide behind science as it disappears.
That is to say, the problem you are gesturing towards seems to be a symptom of this state of affairs. Philosophers have to justify themselves to their institutional benefactors, and they do that by pretending to be scientists. The cost has not been a small one.
Where should I start with Cavell?
There are a couple things I appreciate about analytic philosophy: conceptual clarity and the logical progression of ideas. These are exactly the qualities that I feel are missing from this article.
For example, the author denigrates analytic philosophy several times, calling it "rationalistic." What is this supposed to mean? It's unclear. The author doesn't make any attempt at explicating his understanding of the concept.
And what reasons does the author give for sharing his view of analytic philosophy as "rationalistic"? This too is unclear. There is an abundance of assertions, name-calling, and passive aggressive metaphors. But the article comes up short on providing any evidence.
When you get past the flowery rhetoric, it seems the author's central criticism is this: "We learned how to structure arguments without nurturing the ways of life in which they might make sense."
Indeed, courses in philosophy typically won't instruct students on how to live their lives. And that's exactly as it should be!
Courses in chemistry, finance, math, nursing, and basically every other field don't tell their students how to live their lives. Rather, they impart a body of knowledge and a way of thinking that helps students excel in their professions. There is nothing wrong with this, and philosophy does likewise. Among other things, it teaches students how to structure arguments in a logical way. Complaining about this is like complaining that chemistry courses teach students about the periodic table of elements.
If you would instead like someone to give you personalized, non-rational, "definitive" conclusions to your life questions, consider self-help gurus or religious fanatics.
As one of your other commenters said below, it is not the job of academia to tell students how they ought to live their lives. That is well and good, and I happen to agree. Indeed, a big part of philosophy’s value is that it gives students the tools to see through that kind of BS.
But I have more sympathy than that other commenter: after all, you are not writing here as an academic, and you don’t owe us the kind of analyses that they are demanding.
Instead, what seems to be missing from your piece is any discussion of the internal dynamics within the institutions that have brought this unfortunate situation about.
Philosophers and the departments they run at universities have sleep-walked into a situation where the strange, poujadiste mindset of business managers and petty administrators dictates their fortunes. Philosophy is not science, it ought not to be evaluated on the same metrics, of “impact” or whatever. And now, philosophy, with its frequent pretensions to “scientificity” on both sides of the continental/analytic divide, does not so much hide behind science as it disappears.
That is to say, the problem you are gesturing towards seems to be a symptom of this state of affairs. Philosophers have to justify themselves to their institutional benefactors, and they do that by pretending to be scientists. The cost has not been a small one.
Does a system that subjugates remain fully rational? Does rationality contend with wonder, or extend it?