The article ends by suggesting we might rethink falsifiability as the main test for astrology's legitimacy (Natal Astrology). Why change a standard that has worked so well for science throughout history just for the sake of Natal astrology? Perhaps I am not yet familiar with the significance of Natal astrology and the knowledge it can provide, but it seems almost unnecessary to question the framework of something being scientific or not just for this one case.
Are there other fields that, like astrology, push us to question the falsifiability rule?
However, maybe I need to be more philosophical and question more readily and eagerly. I look forward to the next discussion and article!
P.S. (See below first!) I should also add that (apart from considerations of Popper specifically) it would of course be super-wrongheaded to accommodate our scientific assessment "just for the sake of" any novel theory (like astrology). However, that leaves the question of how we should determine whether a theory qualifies as "science" rather than "pseudoscience," and some of those who most vehemently oppose astrology (and religion as well, by the way) do so on the basis of falsifiability considerations. So there aresome remaining puzzles here. How indeed do we make that distinction, if falsifiability is not the promising test many used to think it was? If you have any ideas, do let us know!
Hello Zayd! Thank you for the comment and I'm very pleased you liked the article. You raise the issue of falsifiability (Popper's well-known theory). You're of course right to be wary of throwing out established practice just to save a risky theory. If scientists actually proceeded as Popper's theory suggests, you'd have something of a case.
But despite what some in the field believe, this seems not to be how science actually proceeds. Scientific tests do not hold to a yes or no verdict (as Popper seemed to think): they rely instead on degrees of confirmation based on probabilities (as Bayesians and others would insist). And so over past decades the consensus among most philosophers of science (not everyone, of course) seems to be that Popper's theory was wrong.
There are other reasons for this strong-seeming consensus as well, and I hope to write more about this for a future issue.
We depend on thoughtful people like you to keep the discussion in this club going, so I hope we'll hear more from you!
The article ends by suggesting we might rethink falsifiability as the main test for astrology's legitimacy (Natal Astrology). Why change a standard that has worked so well for science throughout history just for the sake of Natal astrology? Perhaps I am not yet familiar with the significance of Natal astrology and the knowledge it can provide, but it seems almost unnecessary to question the framework of something being scientific or not just for this one case.
Are there other fields that, like astrology, push us to question the falsifiability rule?
However, maybe I need to be more philosophical and question more readily and eagerly. I look forward to the next discussion and article!
P.S. (See below first!) I should also add that (apart from considerations of Popper specifically) it would of course be super-wrongheaded to accommodate our scientific assessment "just for the sake of" any novel theory (like astrology). However, that leaves the question of how we should determine whether a theory qualifies as "science" rather than "pseudoscience," and some of those who most vehemently oppose astrology (and religion as well, by the way) do so on the basis of falsifiability considerations. So there aresome remaining puzzles here. How indeed do we make that distinction, if falsifiability is not the promising test many used to think it was? If you have any ideas, do let us know!
- D. Seiple
Hello Zayd! Thank you for the comment and I'm very pleased you liked the article. You raise the issue of falsifiability (Popper's well-known theory). You're of course right to be wary of throwing out established practice just to save a risky theory. If scientists actually proceeded as Popper's theory suggests, you'd have something of a case.
But despite what some in the field believe, this seems not to be how science actually proceeds. Scientific tests do not hold to a yes or no verdict (as Popper seemed to think): they rely instead on degrees of confirmation based on probabilities (as Bayesians and others would insist). And so over past decades the consensus among most philosophers of science (not everyone, of course) seems to be that Popper's theory was wrong.
There are other reasons for this strong-seeming consensus as well, and I hope to write more about this for a future issue.
We depend on thoughtful people like you to keep the discussion in this club going, so I hope we'll hear more from you!
- D. Seiple