I also have something to say about the doctor dilemma. A key point that was not mentioned is this: If doctors sacrificed the healthy or unconstrained patient to save several patients they would not be successful long term. Because word would get out that when visiting the doctor you may loose your life to save several others. Pretty soon no one’s going to the doctor so no organs get transplanted plus everyone is sicker because they are no longer going to the doctor. Not to mention that the first law of being a physician is premum no nocera or first do no harm.
Fascinating formalization of our favorite moral dilemmas. I think it's an insightful venture to draw the asymmetry between the surgeon and the trolley master.
Could one potentially argue that the singular man tied in the track (of which the train is not currently heading) is as uninvolved in the duress of the situation as the healthy man who walks in the hospital, unbeknownst to his potential harvesting?
Besides the discomfort of being tied to the tracks, the duress of potential death by trolley-crush doesn't exist for the man in the track opposite to the train. It would only enter as duress because of the agency of the trolley master -- that is, the introduction of an artificial constraint.
Intuitively, I think no. The presence of the villain in both cases helps clarify the asymmetry. In each scenario, the villain unjustly introduces artificial constraints into the situation, thereby creating the moral dilemma. This imposition is understood by both examples to be implicitly wrongful (i.e., it violates PNM).
Consider that the trolley operator, because of the villain's actions, MUST violate someone's rights (either the 5 or the 1). Under ordinary conditions, either action would be wrong. However, given the artificial constraint, the operator is forced into a choice between evils (one lesser, one greater). In such a case, while the action remains wrong in an unconditional sense, it may be justified as the least-wrong option available under the circumstances.
This structure, however, does not carry over to the doctor case. There, the doctor is not forced into a rights-violating action. Rather, he retains a genuine alternative in which no one’s rights are directly violated (i.e. refraining from killing the 1 healthy patient, even if that results in the death of the 5). Unlike the trolley operator, he does not have to violate anyone's rights.
Thus, the key difference lies in the presence or absence of genuine constraint: the trolley operator is forced into tragic conflict by a villainous external imposition, whereas the doctor is not. And while it would be wrong for the trolley operator to kill people in ordinary conditions, these conditions are not ordinary, but constrained (akin to the captain "stealing" the merchant's goods in a storm).
This doesn't seem to address Prasidha's objection. The point is that in the trolley case, you ARE introducing a new constraint, namely getting hit by a trolley! In the absence of your intervention, that individual on the side track would not get hit.
True, in your hypothetical scenario they might have been tied there by some other person, but that seems immaterial to the situation.
First, we might modify the hypothetical so that no one's tied at all. Perhaps people have wandered onto the tracks and have their backs turned to the trolley. And second, in the doctor case, we might say all the patients were hogtied, transported in a white van, and thrown into the doctor's office. None of this seems relevant to what one ought to do in either situation.
Whether the constrained choice landscape is natural (e.g., people wander onto the tracks) or artificial (e.g., a villain ties them down) is, I agree, immaterial for the trolley operator’s decision ex post—moral choice must operate within the constraints as given. However, it reveals something important ex ante: it is villainous to tie people to the tracks or to poison them, apropos of nothing.
We might then ask: what makes the villain’s action villainous? Here I would invoke something like PNM or the Formula of Humanity. This is the first reason to introduce the villain: it gives us independent grounds for thinking it is wrong, in the first place, for either the trolley operator or the doctor to kill people arbitrarily.
The second reason is to clarify the asymmetry between the trolley and doctor cases—an asymmetry that becomes clearer if we suppose, in the doctor case, that the five patients have been poisoned by a villain.
Namely: in the doctor case, only five are villain-constrained, whereas in the trolley case, six are. This asymmetry is crucial, because it shows the trolley and doctor are not structurally identical. In particular, the healthy person who walks into the doctor’s office is, in a morally relevant sense, extraneous to the constrained situation.
Rather, the doctor must conscript him into the moral crisis in a way that the trolley operator does not do, and must additionally, it seems, violate PNM in the process (conscription is what makes the villainy villainous in the first place). In the trolley case though, the 1 has meaningfully been conscripted. So as said the cases are importantly not symmetrical.
Just to be clear, the "constraint" refers to the impossibility of an ideal alternative (in this case, saving all lives). The key claim is: the moral structure changes not merely because harm is introduced, but because the option set is altered. It's like the storm case, and it might be better to refer to such cases as a "constrained choice landscape," to avoid confusion with the villain literally constraining the people to the tracks (although the two things are clearly related).
For the trolley operator, the ideal choice (save everyone) is no longer an option. Trying to choose it will result in the worse of the two remaining bad options. Rather, the decision is now between two constrained outcomes, both involving rights violations. That’s what licenses the “least-wrong” framing.
You are answering this with the PNM and Formula of Humanity. But one could just as well say it's wrong for utilitarian, contractarian, or virtue ethical reasons. The fact it's villainous doesn't uniquely support your preferred ethical view, since that judgment is consistent with many ethical views.
"In the doctor case, only five are villain-constrained, whereas in the trolley case, six are."
I'm still not seeing the morally relevant asymmetry here. To reiterate my earlier point, we can remove the villain from the trolley case by saying the one guy on the side track just wandered there himself. So only five people are "villain-constrained." Nonetheless, it's permissible to "conscript" the guy into the moral crisis by turning the trolley and killing him.
And in the doctor case, you can suppose that all six people were tied up and dumped in the doctor's office by a villain. And the doctor is also facing a non-ideal choice: Saving everyone is not an option. Trying to choose it will result in the worse of the two remaining bad options. So they must choose the least wrong framing.
Thank you for the continued engagement! Great points.
1. The point is more that the villian is assumed ex hypothesi to be wrong. This provides a basis of wrongness under ideal conditions. This establishes a basis of unconditional wrongness -- whether deontological, contractarian, utiltarian or otherwise. Everyone agrees "don't tie people to the tracks for nothing."
^1 I claim establishes a duty not to conscript for no good reason!^
2. The moral relevance of the asymmetry referenced (imo) is that, in the trolley case, the 5 and the 1 are already part of a single constrained moral set in a way that they are not in the doctor case.
The key issue is not who caused the constraint (villain or not), but the structure of the constraint once it exists.
In the trolley case, all individuals—whether five on the main track or one on the side track—are already all subject to the trajectory of a single, ongoing harm. The trolley (and the impossibility for them to get out of the way) constitutes a unified constraint field.
The operator's action does not introduce a new person into that field, but rather selects how the existing harm is distributed within it. Even if the one person wandered onto the track independently, they are still already inside the causal structure of the threat (although, unlike in the villain-trolley case, nobody is to blame, so it does not reveal an independent basis of morality already granted by the example -- thou shalt not tie people to the tracks).
By contrast, in the doctor case, the healthy patient is not part of that constraint system at all. The five patients are threatened by one process (their illness or poisoning), while the healthy individual is (until the doctor acts) entirely outside that causal structure. To kill the healthy patient seems therefore not to redistribute an existing harm, but rather to expand the set of persons subjected to harm by introducing a new causal mechanism: conscription.
Even if we modify the cases (remove the villain from trolley, add a villain to the doctor case), this structural difference persists -- the victims are "linked" in the trolley case in a way they are not in the doctor case, and this bears on the moral choice of the operator/doctor.
What matters (for this particular point, on my view) therefore is not how the situation arose, but whether the agent is:
(A) operating within a causally unified constraint landscape, or
(B) manufacturing a new causal linkage that pulls an otherwise unthreatened (and unrelated) person into a tragic situation.
The former is tragic but permissible (lesser-evil selection within a constrained set), the latter is impermissible because it reconstructs the moral landscape itself, rather than navigating it; and this sort of reconstructing we have already conceded to be wrong by granting that the villain is villainous.
I see, so the relevant difference is that in the trolley case there is a "causally unified constraint landscape," whereas in the doctor case there is not.
I'm curious what you mean by this. For example, why couldn't we describe the doctor case like this:
There are 6 people in the doctor's office. Currently, 5 are on track to dying of some illness. But the doctor can choose to redistribute that harm to the 1 patient.
Or why couldn't we describe the trolley case like this:
There are 5 people on the main track. Pulling the lever manufactures a new causal linkage that pulls an otherwise unthreatened (and unrelated) person into a tragic situation.
Is there a principled way of figuring out who counts as being within a "causally unified constraint landscape"?
I’ll only speak about the ship and the train. Both of these descriptions are inadequate and leave very important considerations absent. In fact the key point. Let me explain: In the boat story it is a given choosing loosing loot over losing all than all is preferred in a storm. Because choosing to save the loot is exactly equal to loosing all. There is the mistake. You cannot know for sure except in rare circumstances so if there is a non zero chance of saving the loot and the ship then the mind can create its own odds to convince that it’s logical to choose.
Now the train: total utilitarianism without a shred of humanity. Number one is that all those tied to the tracks are nameless and faceless. Why even make them human, oh wait, you didn’t. While we all have inherent assumed worth and dignity there are differences. What if the protagonist diverted the train to decrease lives lost but the single person that was killed was destined to cure disease but two of the others were destined to be rapists. All humans have value then which would you prefer and how do you know your action is actually the societal good. This is the main problem. The second problem is one of psychology. In the example of the train heading for the group then it will continue in that direction killing the group. But you will have done nothing except for doing nothing. If you divert the train then are you then much more implicated in causing the death of the sole deceased. We can argue that inaction and action is the same but it is not considered to be as it is wrongly assumed that there is more responsibility and causality in action than inaction
Both of your responses have to do with judgments under uncertainty, which are covered in the second part of this essay (forthcoming next week). Here is the response early.
1. In the first case, constrained choice does not require absolute certainty that certain constraints like the storm obtain — only rational expectation, that is, justified belief proportioned to the available evidence. The wise captain in our fable does not need metaphysical proof that the storm will sink the ship. He needs seamanship — the experience-trained perceptual judgment that recognizes a genuine threat and distinguishes it from passing turbulence. His judgment is defeasible, but it is rational, and it is sufficient to ground action, praise, and blame.
2. In the second, it is not given whether the trolley victims are good, bad, and in between, and so no judgment can be made one way or the other. In absence of this information, we default again to the best possible judgment made under uncertainty: assuming you know nothing else about the people, what ought be done.
Bad outcomes under such judgments are possible and unfortunate, but this is actually exactly what distinguishes the view espoused above from utilitarianism and other kinds of consequentialism: one can make no unforced errors and still lose. The captain can pilot the ship as well as possible and still have it sink.
Outcomes therefore, successful or unsuccessful are insufficient to determine the goodness or badness of actions. Yet this does not mean we should attempt what we know or rationally expect to be infeasible. Rather, we should choose the best possible means available, understanding that sometimes absolute success is not entirely up to us.
Sorry you were forced into publishing part II a little early. I still say that while the Bhagavad Gita May say that inaction is just the action of inaction. Us humans qualitatively judge action as more volitional and inaction as more passive. I’m not saying passively letting several die when volitionally you can make it so that only one dies is wrong. I’m saying it is not clearly correct. Because it is not always true that saving the many is better than saving the one. I’ll get to part two tomorrow. Thank you also for the engagement.
Great conversation. In the case of the boat you are assuming that the protagonists are perfect econs. Given certain odds tossing the loot is preferred. How important is the loot? It is it the medicines that’s going to save humanity or a a cache of Labubus or for those that love labubus perhaps a stash of used American clothes going to Africa for reusing. The value of the potential lost cargo must be considered in saying the risk of its loss intentionally against the odds of surviving the storm with the cargo. You are not allowing for this. Again increased utility of the cargo needs to be weighed against the odds of surviving with the cargo. For a cargo that will Dave the world from destruction the only choice is to risk taking the ship down with it in the perhaps very low odds of survival.
In the second you make a fatal error. You make the constrained situation of all those tied to the tracks to have the same constraint. But I would say those in the direction of the train switch have a much greater constrained situation since the train is heading toward them. The other is much less constrained because in the absence of an agent to flip the switch he/she is safe. By switching the switch you add a constraint. The value of many is often thought of as greater than the value of one. While I’m not saying this is never true it is not by default true. Both inaction and action in switching the train or equal in that death will occur. But if we operate the switch we are responsible for the additional constraint and the death of the one.
If conclusion if the cargo has great value it may be worth risking total destruction even if there is not good odds. And if the cargo does not have great value then it should be discarded. Then the conversation goes to how do you value the cargo. Some would say a vaccine to prevent millions of human illnesses has greater value then a horde of gold but the greedy narcissist might think the later. I for one may chose to go down with the ship if my cargo had a chance of being saved and is intended to save the world.
On your first point, unless I am mistaken, your objection to the boat case closely mirrors your earlier objection to the doctor case. My answer remains the same: in the absence of further specification, we must reason using the information given and adopt the best judgment available under those constraints. We cannot reasonably be judged for what we could not reasonably have known.
That said, I agree with your broader point. Real ethical deliberation cannot be conveniently be reduced to strict, mechanical rules. As I argue in the second part of the paper (linked below), ethical judgment therefore requires the development of a faculty of phronesis (the capacity to weigh the full context, including the value of the cargo, the probabilities of survival, and the stakes involved). This kind of judgment is much more a matter of having a well-trained moral intuition (trained, I would argue on pragmatic idealism), and resists complete formalization because each individual case has its own idiosyncracies.
The base case, however, remains relatively simple: absent special considerations (e.g., world-saving cargo), we evaluate based on typical stakes and expected outcomes. Your example rightly highlights how altering the value of the cargo can shift the rational choice, and this is precisely the kind of contextual sensitivity phronesis and pragmatic idealism (the framework proposed in the paper) as a whole is meant to capture.
On your second point, I have addressed a similar concern in Prashida's comment, but to restate concisely: the trolley operator is, by stipulation, placed in a situation where he must violate some people's rights (either killing them or willfully letting them die). While it is wrong to violate rights, tragically, the trolley operator is not permitted the counterfactual option in which everyone survives (which would indeed be the only good option). He must choose between two bad options -- the villain has forced him into this dilemma.
And as you note, in the absence of more information, all equal we judge 5 lives to be worth more than 1 (even though, in a perfect world, nobody would have to be constrained to die). Check out my answer to Prashida for a deeper answer!
I am looking forward to reading more it seems aligned with my philosophy but too soon to tell!
Love to hear it. Check out the second installment!
I may also put an addendum on my blog dealing with all major trolley variants :)
Can’t wait until part 2. Sounds necessary and interesting.
I also have something to say about the doctor dilemma. A key point that was not mentioned is this: If doctors sacrificed the healthy or unconstrained patient to save several patients they would not be successful long term. Because word would get out that when visiting the doctor you may loose your life to save several others. Pretty soon no one’s going to the doctor so no organs get transplanted plus everyone is sicker because they are no longer going to the doctor. Not to mention that the first law of being a physician is premum no nocera or first do no harm.
Way ahead of me Gary, I talk about long term stability of practices being a criterion of moral action in part II!
Fascinating formalization of our favorite moral dilemmas. I think it's an insightful venture to draw the asymmetry between the surgeon and the trolley master.
Could one potentially argue that the singular man tied in the track (of which the train is not currently heading) is as uninvolved in the duress of the situation as the healthy man who walks in the hospital, unbeknownst to his potential harvesting?
Besides the discomfort of being tied to the tracks, the duress of potential death by trolley-crush doesn't exist for the man in the track opposite to the train. It would only enter as duress because of the agency of the trolley master -- that is, the introduction of an artificial constraint.
Great question!
Intuitively, I think no. The presence of the villain in both cases helps clarify the asymmetry. In each scenario, the villain unjustly introduces artificial constraints into the situation, thereby creating the moral dilemma. This imposition is understood by both examples to be implicitly wrongful (i.e., it violates PNM).
Consider that the trolley operator, because of the villain's actions, MUST violate someone's rights (either the 5 or the 1). Under ordinary conditions, either action would be wrong. However, given the artificial constraint, the operator is forced into a choice between evils (one lesser, one greater). In such a case, while the action remains wrong in an unconditional sense, it may be justified as the least-wrong option available under the circumstances.
This structure, however, does not carry over to the doctor case. There, the doctor is not forced into a rights-violating action. Rather, he retains a genuine alternative in which no one’s rights are directly violated (i.e. refraining from killing the 1 healthy patient, even if that results in the death of the 5). Unlike the trolley operator, he does not have to violate anyone's rights.
Thus, the key difference lies in the presence or absence of genuine constraint: the trolley operator is forced into tragic conflict by a villainous external imposition, whereas the doctor is not. And while it would be wrong for the trolley operator to kill people in ordinary conditions, these conditions are not ordinary, but constrained (akin to the captain "stealing" the merchant's goods in a storm).
This doesn't seem to address Prasidha's objection. The point is that in the trolley case, you ARE introducing a new constraint, namely getting hit by a trolley! In the absence of your intervention, that individual on the side track would not get hit.
True, in your hypothetical scenario they might have been tied there by some other person, but that seems immaterial to the situation.
First, we might modify the hypothetical so that no one's tied at all. Perhaps people have wandered onto the tracks and have their backs turned to the trolley. And second, in the doctor case, we might say all the patients were hogtied, transported in a white van, and thrown into the doctor's office. None of this seems relevant to what one ought to do in either situation.
Whether the constrained choice landscape is natural (e.g., people wander onto the tracks) or artificial (e.g., a villain ties them down) is, I agree, immaterial for the trolley operator’s decision ex post—moral choice must operate within the constraints as given. However, it reveals something important ex ante: it is villainous to tie people to the tracks or to poison them, apropos of nothing.
We might then ask: what makes the villain’s action villainous? Here I would invoke something like PNM or the Formula of Humanity. This is the first reason to introduce the villain: it gives us independent grounds for thinking it is wrong, in the first place, for either the trolley operator or the doctor to kill people arbitrarily.
The second reason is to clarify the asymmetry between the trolley and doctor cases—an asymmetry that becomes clearer if we suppose, in the doctor case, that the five patients have been poisoned by a villain.
Namely: in the doctor case, only five are villain-constrained, whereas in the trolley case, six are. This asymmetry is crucial, because it shows the trolley and doctor are not structurally identical. In particular, the healthy person who walks into the doctor’s office is, in a morally relevant sense, extraneous to the constrained situation.
Rather, the doctor must conscript him into the moral crisis in a way that the trolley operator does not do, and must additionally, it seems, violate PNM in the process (conscription is what makes the villainy villainous in the first place). In the trolley case though, the 1 has meaningfully been conscripted. So as said the cases are importantly not symmetrical.
Thanks for the comment! Interesting take.
Just to be clear, the "constraint" refers to the impossibility of an ideal alternative (in this case, saving all lives). The key claim is: the moral structure changes not merely because harm is introduced, but because the option set is altered. It's like the storm case, and it might be better to refer to such cases as a "constrained choice landscape," to avoid confusion with the villain literally constraining the people to the tracks (although the two things are clearly related).
For the trolley operator, the ideal choice (save everyone) is no longer an option. Trying to choose it will result in the worse of the two remaining bad options. Rather, the decision is now between two constrained outcomes, both involving rights violations. That’s what licenses the “least-wrong” framing.
"What makes the villain’s action villainous?"
You are answering this with the PNM and Formula of Humanity. But one could just as well say it's wrong for utilitarian, contractarian, or virtue ethical reasons. The fact it's villainous doesn't uniquely support your preferred ethical view, since that judgment is consistent with many ethical views.
"In the doctor case, only five are villain-constrained, whereas in the trolley case, six are."
I'm still not seeing the morally relevant asymmetry here. To reiterate my earlier point, we can remove the villain from the trolley case by saying the one guy on the side track just wandered there himself. So only five people are "villain-constrained." Nonetheless, it's permissible to "conscript" the guy into the moral crisis by turning the trolley and killing him.
And in the doctor case, you can suppose that all six people were tied up and dumped in the doctor's office by a villain. And the doctor is also facing a non-ideal choice: Saving everyone is not an option. Trying to choose it will result in the worse of the two remaining bad options. So they must choose the least wrong framing.
Thank you for the continued engagement! Great points.
1. The point is more that the villian is assumed ex hypothesi to be wrong. This provides a basis of wrongness under ideal conditions. This establishes a basis of unconditional wrongness -- whether deontological, contractarian, utiltarian or otherwise. Everyone agrees "don't tie people to the tracks for nothing."
^1 I claim establishes a duty not to conscript for no good reason!^
2. The moral relevance of the asymmetry referenced (imo) is that, in the trolley case, the 5 and the 1 are already part of a single constrained moral set in a way that they are not in the doctor case.
The key issue is not who caused the constraint (villain or not), but the structure of the constraint once it exists.
In the trolley case, all individuals—whether five on the main track or one on the side track—are already all subject to the trajectory of a single, ongoing harm. The trolley (and the impossibility for them to get out of the way) constitutes a unified constraint field.
The operator's action does not introduce a new person into that field, but rather selects how the existing harm is distributed within it. Even if the one person wandered onto the track independently, they are still already inside the causal structure of the threat (although, unlike in the villain-trolley case, nobody is to blame, so it does not reveal an independent basis of morality already granted by the example -- thou shalt not tie people to the tracks).
By contrast, in the doctor case, the healthy patient is not part of that constraint system at all. The five patients are threatened by one process (their illness or poisoning), while the healthy individual is (until the doctor acts) entirely outside that causal structure. To kill the healthy patient seems therefore not to redistribute an existing harm, but rather to expand the set of persons subjected to harm by introducing a new causal mechanism: conscription.
Even if we modify the cases (remove the villain from trolley, add a villain to the doctor case), this structural difference persists -- the victims are "linked" in the trolley case in a way they are not in the doctor case, and this bears on the moral choice of the operator/doctor.
What matters (for this particular point, on my view) therefore is not how the situation arose, but whether the agent is:
(A) operating within a causally unified constraint landscape, or
(B) manufacturing a new causal linkage that pulls an otherwise unthreatened (and unrelated) person into a tragic situation.
The former is tragic but permissible (lesser-evil selection within a constrained set), the latter is impermissible because it reconstructs the moral landscape itself, rather than navigating it; and this sort of reconstructing we have already conceded to be wrong by granting that the villain is villainous.
I see, so the relevant difference is that in the trolley case there is a "causally unified constraint landscape," whereas in the doctor case there is not.
I'm curious what you mean by this. For example, why couldn't we describe the doctor case like this:
There are 6 people in the doctor's office. Currently, 5 are on track to dying of some illness. But the doctor can choose to redistribute that harm to the 1 patient.
Or why couldn't we describe the trolley case like this:
There are 5 people on the main track. Pulling the lever manufactures a new causal linkage that pulls an otherwise unthreatened (and unrelated) person into a tragic situation.
Is there a principled way of figuring out who counts as being within a "causally unified constraint landscape"?
I’ll only speak about the ship and the train. Both of these descriptions are inadequate and leave very important considerations absent. In fact the key point. Let me explain: In the boat story it is a given choosing loosing loot over losing all than all is preferred in a storm. Because choosing to save the loot is exactly equal to loosing all. There is the mistake. You cannot know for sure except in rare circumstances so if there is a non zero chance of saving the loot and the ship then the mind can create its own odds to convince that it’s logical to choose.
Now the train: total utilitarianism without a shred of humanity. Number one is that all those tied to the tracks are nameless and faceless. Why even make them human, oh wait, you didn’t. While we all have inherent assumed worth and dignity there are differences. What if the protagonist diverted the train to decrease lives lost but the single person that was killed was destined to cure disease but two of the others were destined to be rapists. All humans have value then which would you prefer and how do you know your action is actually the societal good. This is the main problem. The second problem is one of psychology. In the example of the train heading for the group then it will continue in that direction killing the group. But you will have done nothing except for doing nothing. If you divert the train then are you then much more implicated in causing the death of the sole deceased. We can argue that inaction and action is the same but it is not considered to be as it is wrongly assumed that there is more responsibility and causality in action than inaction
Gary, thanks for the comment.
Both of your responses have to do with judgments under uncertainty, which are covered in the second part of this essay (forthcoming next week). Here is the response early.
1. In the first case, constrained choice does not require absolute certainty that certain constraints like the storm obtain — only rational expectation, that is, justified belief proportioned to the available evidence. The wise captain in our fable does not need metaphysical proof that the storm will sink the ship. He needs seamanship — the experience-trained perceptual judgment that recognizes a genuine threat and distinguishes it from passing turbulence. His judgment is defeasible, but it is rational, and it is sufficient to ground action, praise, and blame.
2. In the second, it is not given whether the trolley victims are good, bad, and in between, and so no judgment can be made one way or the other. In absence of this information, we default again to the best possible judgment made under uncertainty: assuming you know nothing else about the people, what ought be done.
Bad outcomes under such judgments are possible and unfortunate, but this is actually exactly what distinguishes the view espoused above from utilitarianism and other kinds of consequentialism: one can make no unforced errors and still lose. The captain can pilot the ship as well as possible and still have it sink.
Outcomes therefore, successful or unsuccessful are insufficient to determine the goodness or badness of actions. Yet this does not mean we should attempt what we know or rationally expect to be infeasible. Rather, we should choose the best possible means available, understanding that sometimes absolute success is not entirely up to us.
Sorry you were forced into publishing part II a little early. I still say that while the Bhagavad Gita May say that inaction is just the action of inaction. Us humans qualitatively judge action as more volitional and inaction as more passive. I’m not saying passively letting several die when volitionally you can make it so that only one dies is wrong. I’m saying it is not clearly correct. Because it is not always true that saving the many is better than saving the one. I’ll get to part two tomorrow. Thank you also for the engagement.
Great conversation. In the case of the boat you are assuming that the protagonists are perfect econs. Given certain odds tossing the loot is preferred. How important is the loot? It is it the medicines that’s going to save humanity or a a cache of Labubus or for those that love labubus perhaps a stash of used American clothes going to Africa for reusing. The value of the potential lost cargo must be considered in saying the risk of its loss intentionally against the odds of surviving the storm with the cargo. You are not allowing for this. Again increased utility of the cargo needs to be weighed against the odds of surviving with the cargo. For a cargo that will Dave the world from destruction the only choice is to risk taking the ship down with it in the perhaps very low odds of survival.
In the second you make a fatal error. You make the constrained situation of all those tied to the tracks to have the same constraint. But I would say those in the direction of the train switch have a much greater constrained situation since the train is heading toward them. The other is much less constrained because in the absence of an agent to flip the switch he/she is safe. By switching the switch you add a constraint. The value of many is often thought of as greater than the value of one. While I’m not saying this is never true it is not by default true. Both inaction and action in switching the train or equal in that death will occur. But if we operate the switch we are responsible for the additional constraint and the death of the one.
If conclusion if the cargo has great value it may be worth risking total destruction even if there is not good odds. And if the cargo does not have great value then it should be discarded. Then the conversation goes to how do you value the cargo. Some would say a vaccine to prevent millions of human illnesses has greater value then a horde of gold but the greedy narcissist might think the later. I for one may chose to go down with the ship if my cargo had a chance of being saved and is intended to save the world.
Gary, thanks for the continued engagement.
On your first point, unless I am mistaken, your objection to the boat case closely mirrors your earlier objection to the doctor case. My answer remains the same: in the absence of further specification, we must reason using the information given and adopt the best judgment available under those constraints. We cannot reasonably be judged for what we could not reasonably have known.
That said, I agree with your broader point. Real ethical deliberation cannot be conveniently be reduced to strict, mechanical rules. As I argue in the second part of the paper (linked below), ethical judgment therefore requires the development of a faculty of phronesis (the capacity to weigh the full context, including the value of the cargo, the probabilities of survival, and the stakes involved). This kind of judgment is much more a matter of having a well-trained moral intuition (trained, I would argue on pragmatic idealism), and resists complete formalization because each individual case has its own idiosyncracies.
Link to part II: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Fm5jlNC0SpGcnvUxEt6FuH5OEBg5FOrByiKRCKgDBiI/edit?tab=t.0
The base case, however, remains relatively simple: absent special considerations (e.g., world-saving cargo), we evaluate based on typical stakes and expected outcomes. Your example rightly highlights how altering the value of the cargo can shift the rational choice, and this is precisely the kind of contextual sensitivity phronesis and pragmatic idealism (the framework proposed in the paper) as a whole is meant to capture.
On your second point, I have addressed a similar concern in Prashida's comment, but to restate concisely: the trolley operator is, by stipulation, placed in a situation where he must violate some people's rights (either killing them or willfully letting them die). While it is wrong to violate rights, tragically, the trolley operator is not permitted the counterfactual option in which everyone survives (which would indeed be the only good option). He must choose between two bad options -- the villain has forced him into this dilemma.
And as you note, in the absence of more information, all equal we judge 5 lives to be worth more than 1 (even though, in a perfect world, nobody would have to be constrained to die). Check out my answer to Prashida for a deeper answer!
Thans again for the lively discussion.